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Abstract
Modeling several competitive leaders and followers acting in an electricity market
leads to coupled systems of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints,
called equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). We consider a
simplified model for competition in electricity markets under uncertainty of demand
in an electricity network as a (stochastic) multi-leader-follower game. First order
necessary conditions are developed for the corresponding stochastic EPEC based on
a result of Outrata [17]. For applying the general result an explicit representation of
the co-derivative of the normal cone mapping to a polyhedron is derived (Proposition
3.2). Later the co-derivative formula is used for verifying constraint qualifications
and for identifying M -stationary solutions of the stochastic EPEC if the demand is
represented by a finite number of scenarios.
Keywords: Electricity markets, bidding, noncooperative games, equilibrium constraint,
EPEC, optimality condition, co-derivative, random demand.
1 Introduction
In [17], J. Outrata formulated first order necessary conditions for the following equilibrium
problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC):
min
{
fi
(
xi, z
)
|0 ∈ F (x, z) +NU(z)
}
(i = 1, . . . , N) (EPEC)
∗This work was supported by the DFG Research Center Matheon Mathematics for key technologies
in Berlin
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Here, the xi ∈ Rn refer to decisions taken by N players (e.g., market competitors), whose
objective functions fi do not only depend on their own decisions x
i but also on some
parameter z which might represent an exterior decision (e.g., in a leader-follower system).
All decisions together are linked by a generalized equation 0 ∈ F (x, z)+NU(z) which could
model some equilibrium constraint or the solution of a parameter-dependent optimization
problem. It is assumed, that U is some closed convex set and NU refers to its normal cone.
In principle, (EPEC) is nothing else but a coupled system of mathematical programs with
equilibrium constraints (MPECs), where each single MPEC describes the optimization
problem solved by the individual players given the decision of the other players. The
vector
(
x¯1, . . . , x¯N , z¯
)
is declared to be a solution to (EPEC), if for i = 1, . . . , N the
vectors (x¯i, z¯) are solutions to the MPEC
min
{
fi (y, z)
∣∣0 ∈ F (x¯1, . . . , x¯i−1, y, x¯i+1x¯N , z¯) +NU(z¯)} ,
i.e., non of the players can improve his decision given the decisions of his competitors.
As pointed out in [17], these MPECs are typically nonconvex even under convexity as-
sumptions on the data fi, F, U . Therefore it makes sense to identify possible solutions
by means of first order necessary conditions. In [17], it was proposed to do so by using
Mordukhovich’s co-derivative D∗ of multifunctions (see [15]) as a basic tool. For recent
extensions of these ideas (e.g., to stability issues in the context of quasi-variational in-
equalities), we refer to [16] (see also [15]). We cite the following Theorem from [17],
slightly adapted to the purposes of our paper:
Theorem 1.1 Let (x¯, z¯) be a solution to (EPEC). If, for all i = 1, . . . , N , the multifunc-
tions
u 7→
{(
xi, z
) ∣∣u ∈ F (x¯1, . . . , x¯i−1, xi, x¯i+1, . . . , x¯N , z) +NU(z)}
are polyhedral or satisfy the constraint qualification
0 = (∇xiF (x¯, z¯))
T
v
0 ∈ (∇zF (x¯, z¯))
T
v +D∗NU(z¯,−F (x¯, z¯))(v)
}
=⇒ v = 0,
then, for all i = 1, . . . , N , there exist v¯i such that
0 = ∇xifi (x¯, z¯) + (∇xiF (x¯, z¯))
T
v¯i (1)
0 ∈ ∇zfi (x¯, z¯) + (∇zF (x¯, z¯))
T
v¯i +D∗NU(z¯,−F (x¯, z¯))(v¯
i). (2)
We shall adopt from [17] the nameM (ordukhovich)- stationary point for any (x¯, z¯) satisfy-
ing (1) and (2). The main difficulty in the verification of both the constraint qualification
and the optimality conditions (1) and (2) is the computation of the co-derivative D∗NU
to the normal cone mapping associated with U . Explicit formulae ready to use can be
found in [2] and [18] for the cases of U being a nonnegative orthant or a rectangle. On
the other hand, many practical applications like electricity spot market modeling lead
to sets U which are general polyhedra. The purpose of this note is threefold: first, it is
intended to apply the ideas presented so far to a simplified model of electricity markets
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under an independent system operator regime similar to [4] and [11]. Second, and sub-
ordinate to this aim, an explicit formula for D∗NU is derived for general polyhedra U .
Third, the whole problem is put into a stochastic framework which is of much interest
due to uncertainties in electricity demands. For discrete distributions, a characterizing
system of relations for identifying M-stationary solutions is provided and such solutions
are explicitly calculated for a simple example.
Since electricity production and trading decisions of smaller power firms (followers) do
not influence market prices, electricity portfolio optimization models for such firms may be
developed without regarding their market interactions. Inputs of portfolio optimization
models are stochastic price and demand processes in the relevant time horizon (see, e.g.,
[3]). To extend stochastic portfolio optimization models to firms having market power
(leaders), the use of modified market prices is suggested, e.g., in [1].
To investigate the behavior of power firms in deregulated electricity markets, game-
theoretic models are employed (see, e.g., [7, 8, 28]). Such models have to incorporate
the specific features of electricity markets, namely, the transmission network and the
bidding of price-quantity pairs of each generator in the network. When modeling single-
leader-follower games one arrives at mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints
(MPECs). Presently, theory and numerical methods for MPECs is well developed. We
refer to the monographs [14, 19, 5], the survey [12] and to [25, 6]. Extensions to stochastic
MPECs (SMPECs) can be found in [26, 27] and applications to electricity markets are
discussed, e.g., in [9, 21].
The modeling of multi-leader-follower games leads to coupled systems of MPECs or
equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). In recent years, much effort
has been directed to the theory of such games [20] and to numerical methods [13] based
on nonlinear programming and nonlinear complementarity (re)formulations. Furthermore,
EPEC models for electricity markets with generators and customers located on a network
have been developed and analyzed in [11, 10, 22]. A stochastic EPEC (SEPEC) modeling
an electricity market under demand uncertainty is studied in [4].
2 A simplified model for competition in electricity
spot markets
In the following, we consider a model for competition in electricity spot markets which is
a simplified for the purpose of our analysis version of models presented in [4] and [11]. We
assume that some electricity network is represented by an oriented graph, whose m edges
correspond to transmission lines and whose N nodes refer to places at which a demand
for electricity is observed and at which electricity is generated. Neglecting, for the sake
of simplicity, transmission losses, the satisfaction of demand may be modeled as
q +By ≥ d. (3)
Here, d ∈ RN refers to the vector of demands at each node, q ∈ RN is the vector of
electricity generated at the same nodes and y ∈ Rm represents the oriented flow vector
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of electricity along the edges of the graph. B is the incidence matrix of the electricity
network. Typically, q and y are simply bounded by
0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ, −yˆ ≤ y ≤ yˆ,
where the inequality signs are to be understood component-wise. Generators bid a cost
function to an independent system operator (ISO):
ci(qi) = αiqi + βiq
2
i (i = 1, . . . N).
These may differ from the true cost functions
Ci(qi) = γiqi + δiq
2
i (i = 1, . . . N).
Throughout the paper, we shall assume that βi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , thus accepting the
idea that cost functions are typically convex and leaving aside the purely linear case. More
general cost functions were allowed in [4]. Here, we restrict ourselves to the quadratic
case as considered in [11]. The ISO determines a vector of generated electricity satisfying
the constraints above and minimizing the overall costs:
min
q,y
{
N∑
i=1
ci(qi) |(q, y) ∈ G
}
, (4)
where
G :=
{
(q, y) ∈ RN+m
∣∣ q +By ≥ d, 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ, −yˆ ≤ y ≤ yˆ} .
Note that, by convexity, an optimal solution q∗ of (4) is characterized as a solution to the
generalized equation
0 ∈
(
α + 2 [diag β] q
0
)
+NG(q, y). (5)
Here, [diag β] denotes the diagonal matrix composed of diagonal entries βi. With q
∗
being an optimal solution to (4), the clearing price charged by generator i amounts to the
derivative of its bid cost function at q∗i (see [11]):
pii = αi + 2βiq
∗
i .
Thus, generator i’s profit calculates as
(αi − γi) q
∗
i + (2βi − δi) (q
∗
i )
2
.
Therefore, given some fixed bid coefficients
(
α¯j, β¯j
)
of the remaining competitors j 6=
i, generator i solves the following mathematical program with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC):
max
αi,βi,q,y
{
(αi − γi) qi + (2βi − δi) q
2
i
∣∣∣∣0 ∈
(
θ(αi, βi, q)
0
)
+NG(q, y)
}
, (6)
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where
θ(αi, βi, q) := (α¯1, . . . , α¯i−1, αi, α¯i+1, . . . , α¯N) + 2
[
diag
(
β¯1, . . . , β¯i−1, βi, β¯i+1, . . . , β¯N
)]
q
(compare (5)). Since all competitors solve a similar MPEC given the decisions of the
remaining ones, the coupled system of MPECs
min
αi,βi,q,y
{
(γi − αi) qi + (δi − 2βi) q
2
i
∣∣∣∣0 ∈
(
α+ 2 [diag β] q
0
)
+NG(q, y)
}
(7)
(i = 1, . . . , N)
is called an EPEC (equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints). This EPEC falls
into the general class of type (EPEC) presented in the introduction. Indeed, in our specific
model, one has to put xi := (αi, βi), z := (q, y), U := G as well as
fi (αi, βi, q, y) = (γi − αi) qi + (δi − 2βi) q
2
i
F (α, β, q, y) =
(
α + 2 [diag β] q
0
)
. (8)
Specializing Theorem 1.1 from the introduction to our setting, we obtain:
Theorem 2.1 Let
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
be a solution to (7). If, for all i = 1, . . . , N , the multifunc-
tions
u 7→
{
(αi, βi, q, y)
∣∣u ∈ F (α¯1, β¯1, . . . , α¯i−1, β¯i−1, αi, βi, α¯i+1, β¯i+1, . . . , α¯N , β¯N , q, y)
+NG(q, y)} (9)
are polyhedral or satisfy the constraint qualification
0 =
(
∇(αi,βi)F
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
))T
v
0 ∈
(
∇(q,y)F
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
))T
v +D∗NG((q¯, y¯) ,−F
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
)(v)
}
=⇒ v = 0, (10)
then, for all i = 1, . . . , N , there exist v¯i such that
0 = ∇(αi,βi)fi
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
+
(
∇(αi,βi)F
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
))T
v¯i (11)
0 ∈ ∇(αi,βi)fi
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
+
(
∇(αi,βi)F
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
))T
v¯i (12)
+D∗NG(q¯, y¯,−F
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
)(v¯i).
One observes that the difficult part both in the verification of the constraint qualification
and in the application of the first order necessary condition consists in calculating the
co-derivative D∗NG. This is the aim of the following section.
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3 On the co-derivative of the normal cone mapping
to a polyhedron
This section is devoted to the derivation of an explicit formula for the co-derivative of
the normal cone mapping to a polyhedron. Before addressing this topic, we recall the
definition of the Mordukhovich normal cone (also called limiting normal cone) and the
the induced co-derivative (see [15]):
Definition 3.1 Let S ⊆ Rn be an arbitrary set and x¯ ∈ clS. Then, the Mordukhovich
normal cone to S at x¯ is defined by
NS (x¯) := Limsupx→x¯,x∈S [TS (x)]
∗
,
where [TS (x)]
∗ refers to the negative polar of the contingent cone TS (x) to S at x and
’Limsup’ denotes the upper limit in the sense of Kuratowski-Painleve´ convergence.
For a multifunction Φ : Rn ⇉ Rp, consider a point of its graph: (x, y) ∈ gphΦ. The
Mordukhovich normal cone induces the following co-derivative D∗Φ (x, y) : Rp ⇉ Rn of Φ
at (x, y):
D∗Φ (x, y) (y∗) = {x∗ ∈ Rn| (x∗,−y∗) ∈ NgphΦ (x, y)} ∀y∗ ∈ Rp.
Now, we consider a polyhedron C := {x ∈ Rn|Ax ≤ b}, where b ∈ Rm and A is a matrix of
order (m,n). Let (x0, v0) ∈ gphNC . As C is convex, the Mordukhovich normal cone NC
reduces to the normal cone in the sense of convex analysis here. In particular x0 ∈ C and
v0 ∈ NC (x
0). With ai and bi referring to the rows of A and components of b, respectively,
let
I := {i ∈ {1, . . . , m}|
〈
ai, x
0
〉
= bi}
be the set of active indices at x0. Since v0 ∈ NC (x
0), there exits λi ≥ 0 for i ∈ I, such
that
v0 =
∑
i∈I
λiai. (13)
We introduce the following subset of I:
J := {i ∈ I|λi > 0}.
Finally, for each index subset I ′ ⊆ I, we introduce the closed cone
FI′ = {h ∈ Rn| 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 (i ∈ I\I ′)}, 〈ai, h〉 = 0 (i ∈ I ′)} (14)
as well as the characteristic index set
χ(I ′) := {j ∈ I| 〈aj , h〉 = 0 ∀h ∈ FI′}. (15)
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Proposition 3.2 With the notation introduced above, one has that
NgphNC
(
x0, v0
)
=
⋃
J⊆I1⊆I2⊆I
PI1,I2 ×QI1,I2,
where
PI1,I2 = con {ai|i ∈ χ (I2) \I1}+ span {ai|i ∈ I1}
QI1,I2 = {h ∈ R
n| 〈ai, h〉 = 0 (i ∈ I1) , 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 (i ∈ χ (I2) \I1)}.
Here, con and span refer to the convex conic and linear hull, respectively.
Proof. First note, that the set gphNC is no longer convex although the polyhedron
C is so. As a consequence, the Mordukhovich normal cone NgphNC (x
0, v0) to this set
evaluated at the point (x0, v0) needs not be convex either. According to a well-known
result by Dontchev and Rockafellar ([2, Proof of Theorem 2]), one has that
NgphNC
(
x0, v0
)
=
⋃
Fj⊆Fi
(Fi − Fj)
∗ × (Fi − Fj) , (16)
where the Fi are the closed faces of the cone
K0 := TC
(
x0
)
∩ {v0}⊥
and TC denotes the tangent cone to C in the sense of convex analysis. As in Definition
3.1, we use an asterisk for denoting the negative polar (or dual) cone. Combining the
well-known representation
TC
(
x0
)
= {h ∈ Rn| 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 (i ∈ I)},
with (13) and the definition of the index set J , one immediately derives that
K0 = {h ∈ Rn| 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 (i ∈ I\J) , 〈ai, h〉 = 0 (i ∈ J)}.
Now, any closed face of K0 is given by a cone FI′ as introduced in (14) and with I
′ being
an arbitrary index set with J ⊆ I ′ ⊆ I. Clearly, the implication
I1 ⊆ I2 =⇒ FI2 ⊆ FI1
holds true for all index sets I1, I2 such that J ⊆ I1, I2 ⊆ I. While the reverse implication
cannot be derived in general, one may easily show the following for the same index sets:
FI2 ⊆ FI1 =⇒ FI2 = FI1∪I2.
In other words, there exists an index set I3, such that FI2 = FI3 ⊆ FI1 and I1 ⊆ I3.
Summarizing, any pair of index sets I1, I2 with J ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ I induces a pair of closed
faces of K0 such that one is a subset of the other, and, conversely, any such pair of closed
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faces of K0 can be represented by a pair of index sets I1, I2 with J ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ I.
Consequently, we may rewrite (16) as
NgphNC
(
x0, v0
)
=
⋃
J⊆I1⊆I2⊆I
(FI1 − FI2)
∗ × (FI1 − FI2) . (17)
We claim that
FI1 − FI2 = QI1,I2 ∀I1, I2 : J ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ I, (18)
where QI1,I2 is defined in the statement of the proposition. Recall that, by the very
definition of χ in (15), one always has that I2 ⊆ χ (I2) ⊆ I. Now, given any h ∈ FI1 −FI2,
one has h = h1 − h2 for some h1 ∈ FI1 and h2 ∈ FI2. The inclusion I1 ⊆ I2 along with
(14) then implies that
〈ai, h1〉 = 〈ai, h2〉 = 0 (i ∈ I1) ; 〈ai, h1〉 ≤ 0 (i ∈ I\I1) 〈ai, h2〉 = 0 (i ∈ I2) .
By (15), we have that 〈ai, h2〉 = 0 for all i ∈ χ (I2). Moreover, 〈ai, h1〉 ≤ 0 for all
i ∈ χ (I2) \I1. Altogether, this establishes the inclusion ’⊆’ of (18).
For the reverse inclusion, let h ∈ QI1,I2 be arbitrary. In case that χ (I2) = I, it follows
form the definition of QI1,I2 that h ∈ FI1 ⊆ FI1 − FI2 (due to 0 ∈ FI2). Hence, we may
assume now that χ (I2) $ I. By (15), we have
χ (I2) = {j ∈ I| 〈aj, h
′〉 = 0 ∀h′ ∈ FI2}.
As a consequence, for all j ∈ I\χ (I2) there exists some hj ∈ FI2 such that 〈aj, hj〉 < 0.
We put
h∗ :=
∑
j∈I\χ(I2)
hj .
Note that h∗ is well-defined by I\χ (I2) 6= ∅. Clearly, h
∗ ∈ FI2 and
〈ai, h
∗〉 = 〈ai, hi〉+
∑
j∈I\χ(I2)
j 6=i
〈ai, hj〉 < 0
by definition of hi and by 〈ai, hj〉 ≤ 0 for all j ∈ I\χ (I2) (recall that hj ∈ FI2). This
allows to define
t := max
{
0, max
i∈I\χ(I2)
{
−
〈ai, h〉
〈ai, h∗〉
}}
≥ 0.
Finally, put h¯ := h+ th∗. Due to h ∈ QI1,I2 and h
∗ ∈ FI2 , we have that
〈ai, h〉 = 0 (i ∈ I1) ; 〈ai, h
∗〉 = 0 (i ∈ χ (I2)) ; 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 (i ∈ χ (I2) \I1) .
Consequently, recalling that I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ χ (I2), it follows that
〈
ai, h¯
〉
= 0 for all i ∈ I1 and〈
ai, h¯
〉
≤ 0 for all i ∈ χ (I2) \I1. We claim that〈
ai, h¯
〉
= 〈ai, h〉+ t 〈ai, h
∗〉 ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I\χ (I2) .
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Indeed, the inequality is obvious if 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0, because of t ≥ 0 and 〈ai, h
∗〉 < 0. If
〈ai, h〉 > 0, then the same inequality follows from
t ≥ −
〈ai, h〉
〈ai, h∗〉
by definition of t. Summarizing the previous relations, one arrives at h¯ ∈ FI1. Therefore,
h = h¯ − th∗ ∈ FI1 − FI2 , where we used that th
∗ ∈ FI2 due to t ≥ 0. This finishes the
proof of (18).
Evidently, PI1,I2 = Q
∗
I1,I2
for PI1,I2 as defined in the statement of the proposition.
Consequently, the proposition is proved upon referring to (18) and (17).
Remark 3.3 If, the vectors {ai |i ∈ I } happen to be linearly independent, then χ(I
′) = I ′
for all I ′ ⊆ I and the definitions of PI1,I2 and QI1,I2 in Proposition 3.2 simplify accordingly.
Corollary 3.4 In the setting of Proposition 3.2, one has the following:
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) ⊆ con {ai|i ∈ χ
(
Ia(s) ∪ Ib(s)
)
\Ia(s)}+ span {ai|i ∈ I
a(s)}
if 〈ai, s〉 = 0 ∀i ∈ J and 〈ai, s〉 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ χ(J)\J
and
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) = ∅ otherwise.
Here,
Ia(s) := {i ∈ I| 〈ai, s〉 = 0}, I
b(s) := {i ∈ I| 〈ai, s〉 > 0}.
Proof. ¿From the definition of the co-derivative and from Proposition 3.2, it follows that
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) = {r| (r,−s) ∈ NgphNC
(
x0, v0
)
}
= {r|∃I1, I2 : J ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ I, r ∈ PI1,I2,−s ∈ QI1,I2}. (19)
Since QI1,I2 ⊆ QJ,J for all I1, I2 with J ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ I, it follows that D
∗NC (x
0, v0) (s)
is non-empty only if −s ∈ QJ,J which means, by definition, that 〈ai, s〉 = 0 for all i ∈ J
and 〈ai, s〉 ≥ 0 for all i ∈ χ(J)\J . This proves the second statement of the corollary. We
show that
QIa(s),Ia(s)∪Ib(s) ⊆ QI1,I2 ∀I1, I2 : J ⊆ I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ I ∀s : −s ∈ QI1,I2. (20)
Indeed, the definitions of the respective index sets yield that I1 ⊆ I
a(s) and
χ(I2) ⊆ I
a(s) ∪ Ib(s) ⊆ χ(Ia(s) ∪ Ib(s)).
Now, if h ∈ QIa(s),Ia(s)∪Ib(s), then
〈ai, h〉 = 0 ∀i ∈ I
a(s), 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ χ
(
Ia(s) ∪ Ib(s)
)
\Ia(s).
9
It follows that
〈ai, h〉 = 0 ∀i ∈ I1, 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ χ(I2)\I
a(s).
Due to
χ(I2)\I1 ⊆ (χ(I2)\I
a(s)) ∪ (Ia(s)\I1) ,
one arrives that 〈ai, h〉 ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ χ(I2)\I1, whence h ∈ QI1,I2. This establishes (20).
Recalling that PI1,I2 = Q
∗
I1,I2
, it results from (20) that
PI1,I2 = Q
∗
I1,I2
⊆ Q∗Ia(s),Ia(s)∪Ib(s) = PIa(s),Ia(s)∪Ib(s).
Now, we may continue (19) as
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) ⊆ PIa(s),Ia(s)∪Ib(s),
which proves the first statement of the corollary.
The following simplification of Corollary 3.4 is possible under the assumption of linear
independence:
Corollary 3.5 If the {ai |i ∈ I } are linearly independent, then Corollary 3.4 simplifies
to
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) = con {ai|i ∈ I
b(s)}+ span {ai|i ∈ I
a(s)}
if 〈ai, s〉 = 0 ∀i ∈ J,
and
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) = ∅ otherwise.
Proof. In view of Remark 3.3, we have that χ(J) = J and, by Ia(s) ∩ Ib(s) = ∅, that
χ
(
Ia(s) ∪ Ib(s)
)
\Ia(s) =
(
Ia(s) ∪ Ib(s)
)
\Ia(s) = Ib(s). (21)
Then, Corollary 3.4 yields the assertion of the proposition with the first identity replaced
by an inclusion. To prove the reverse inclusion, let
r ∈ con {ai|i ∈ I
b(s)}+ span {ai|i ∈ I
a(s)}
be arbitrary. Then, by definition and due to (21), r ∈ PIa(s),Ia(s)∪Ib(s). Exploiting (21) once
more, the definitions of Ia(s) and Ib(s) provide that −s ∈ QIa(s),Ia(s)∪Ib(s). Consequently,
r ∈ D∗NC (x
0, v0) (s) by definition of D∗NC . This finishes the proof.
Another simplification of Corollary 3.4 can be obtained without linear independence, but
under the assumption of strict complementarity (i.e., λi > 0 for all i ∈ I in (13)):
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Corollary 3.6 If J = I, then
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) =
{
span {ai|i ∈ I} if 〈ai, s〉 = 0 ∀i ∈ I
∅ otherwise
.
Proof. The second case follows immediately from Corollary 3.4 and from J = I. Now,
in the first case, one has 〈ai, s〉 = 0 for all i ∈ J , hence J ⊆ I
a(s) ⊆ I. Consequently,
Ia(s) = I and Ib(s) = ∅. Then,
D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s) ⊆ span {ai|i ∈ I}
by virtue of Corollary 3.4. For the reverse inclusion, let r ∈ span {ai|i ∈ I} be arbitrary.
Observing that χ(I) = I, one has r ∈ PI,I and −s ∈ QI,I . Therefore, r ∈D
∗NC (x
0, v0) (s)
by definition of D∗NC and by Proposition 3.2.
Corollary 3.6 shows that the conic part in the representation of the co-derivative comes
into play only if strict complementarity is violated. For later purpose, we give a slightly
more handy formulation of Corollary 3.6:
Corollary 3.7 If J = I, then
r ∈ D∗NC
(
x0, v0
)
(s)⇐⇒ s ∈ kerAI and r ∈ imA
T
I .
Here, AI refers to the matrix whose row vectors are the ai for i ∈ I.
4 Application to the electricity market model
In this section, we illustrate the results of the previous section by applying them to special
instances of the electricity market model. We consider the EPEC (7). For the simplicity
of the presentation, we restrict our considerations to so-called interior solutions. By this
we mean a solution
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
of (7) satisfying
α¯i, β¯i > 0, 0 < q¯i < qˆi, −yˆi < y¯i < yˆi (i = 1, . . . , N) . (22)
Recall that
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
being a solution of (EPEC) implicitly entails that (q¯, y¯) ∈ G. The
positivity of the bidding coefficients α¯i, β¯i is a very natural assumption. The remaining
relations characterize a solution, where no generator and no flow of electricity reaches its
simple lower and upper bounds.
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4.1 Verification of the constraint qualification
As one can see from the concrete shape of F in (8), this mapping is bilinear in the couple
(β, q) of variables. Thus, it fails to be polyhedral and, in order to apply the first order
necessary conditions of Theorem 2.1, one first has to verify the constraint qualification of
that same theorem.
Lemma 4.1 If the incidence matrix B of the electricity network has rank m (i.e., the
network is acyclic), then any interior solution to (6) satisfies the constraint qualification
of Theorem 2.1.
Proof. We ignore the equation in (10) and observe that, using the partition v = (va, vb),
the inclusion in (10) may be written as
−
(
2 [diag β] va
0
)
∈ D∗NG((q¯, y¯) ,−F
(
α¯, β¯, q¯, y¯
)
)(v). (23)
Now, (q¯, y¯) ∈ G implies that q¯+By¯ ≥ d. If any inequality in this system were strict, then
one could strictly decrease the cost function ci(qi) in (4). This is because α¯i, β¯i > 0 (see
(22)) and so ci is strictly increasing. Then, however, (q¯, y¯) could not be a solution of (4).
Consequently, q¯ + By¯ = d and so I = {1, . . . , N} for the set of active indices defined in
Section 3 (note that the other inequalities defining G are non-binding due to assumption
(22)). It follows that for some λ ∈ RN+ , (5) may be transformed into(
α¯ + 2
[
diag β¯
]
q¯
0
)
=
(
λ
BTλ
)
. (24)
By (22), comparison of the first components yields that λi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Hence, J = I for the index set introduced below (13). This allows to apply Corollary 3.7.
We note that the matrix AI occuring in this corollary coincides in our concrete setting
with the matrix − (I |B ) describing the inequality system q¯+By¯ ≥ d which was actually
shown to be active in each of its components. The minus-sign is due to the fact that
the polyhedron C in section 3 is described by means of ’≤’- inequalities. Applying now
Corollary 3.7 to (23) one obtains the relations
va +Bvb = 0;
(
2
[
diag β¯
]
va
0
)
=
(
µ
BTµ
)
(25)
for a certain multiplier vector µ ∈ RN . Combination of the two components in the second
equation provides
BT
[
diag β¯
]
Bvb = 0.
Since β¯i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N according to (22) and B has rank m by assumption,
it follows that the (m,m)- matrix BT
[
diag β¯
]
B has rank m too. Hence, vb = 0 and,
referring to the first equation of (25), va = 0, and so v = 0, as was to be shown.
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We do not continue here to derive the first order necessary conditions from Theorem 2.1
because it turns out that these do not uniquely identify a stationary solution. Rather a
continuum of such solutions is obtained. This is consistent with a corresponding observa-
tion in [11] related to simultaneous bidding of linear and quadratic cost coefficients. We
shall rather follow the idea in [11] to consider partial bidding of say linear cost coefficients
in order to identify solutions. Before doing so, we generalize our setting by allowing the
demands di in (3) to be random.
4.2 Formulation of a stochastic equilibrium problem under equi-
librium constraints (SEPEC)
Since every player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} does not know the demands dj at least for j 6= i, but
hopefully has access to historical data, it is natural to assume that d is a random vector on
some probability space (Ω,F ,P) whose probability distribution is known (approximately).
This assumption leads to a polyhedral-valued multifunction G defined on Ω with values
in RN+m given by
G(ω) :=
{
(q, y) ∈ RN+m
∣∣ q +By ≥ d(ω), 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ, −yˆ ≤ y ≤ yˆ} .
Hence, the pair (q, y) of generation and flow has to be considered as a RN+m-valued
random vector on (Ω,F ,P) and the ISO has to minimize the expected overall costs, i.e.,
min
q,y
{
E
(
N∑
i=1
ci(qi(ω))
)∣∣∣∣∣ (q(ω), y(ω)) ∈ G(ω), P-a.s.
}
. (26)
Furthermore, the EPEC (7) now becomes the following stochastic equilibrium problem
with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC)
min
αi,βi,q(·),y(·)
{
E
(
(γi − αi) qi(ω) + (δi − 2βi) q
2
i (ω)
) ∣∣∣∣ 0 ∈
(
α+ 2 [diag β] q(ω)
0
)
(27)
+NG(ω)(q(ω), y(ω)), P-a.s.
}
(i = 1, . . . , N),
where the pairs (αi, βi), i = 1, . . . , N , are deterministic and have to be determined before
the realization of the demand, and the pairs (qi(·), yi(·)) i = 1, . . . , N , are stochastic. In
the terminology of two-stage stochastic programming with recourse, the cost coefficients
(αi, βi) are first-stage decisions, while (qi(·), yi(·)) are second-stage or recourse decisions.
Notice that the stochastic EPEC (27) is well defined if G(ω) 6= ∅ holds P-a.s. This
fact is a consequence of the measurability of the set-valued mapping G (e.g., [23, Theorem
14.36]). Due to measurable selection theorems (see, e.g., [23, Corollary 14.6]) there exists
a measurable function (q(·), y(·)) : Ω→ RN+m such that (q(ω), y(ω)) ∈ G(ω), P-a.s. The
expectations exist since q is bounded by qˆ.
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The stochastic EPEC (27) corresponds to a coupled system of (specific) stochastic
MPECs. Theoretical aspects of stochastic MPECs and their solution by sampling methods
are studied in [26, 27]. Existence and stability results for solutions and numerical methods
for stochastic EPECs are widely open.
4.3 Identification of M-stationary solutions for discrete random
demands and partial bidding of linear coefficients
Assume that the probability distribution of d is discrete with finite support and denote
by d(1), . . . , d(K) ∈ RN the K different scenarios of d. The scenarios induce K different
polyhedra of scenario-dependent generation and transmission constraints
Gk :=
{
(q, y) ∈ RN+m
∣∣q +By ≥ d(k), 0 ≤ q ≤ qˆ, −yˆ ≤ y ≤ yˆ} (k = 1, . . . , K).
According to the remarks at the end of Section 4.1, we suppose now the quadratic bid
coefficients to be known, hence, β = δ, and only the linear bid coefficients to be subject
of optimization. The generalized equation (5) now has to be established for each scenario
k as follows:
0 ∈
(
α + 2 [diag δ] q(k)
0
)
+NGk(q
(k), y(k)) k = 1, . . . , K. (28)
Accordingly, generator i’s profit under scenario k equals
(αi − γi) q
(k)∗
i + δi
(
q
(k)∗
i
)2
,
where q(k)∗ is a solution of (28). Then, in order that every generator maximizes its
expected profit, the underlying SEPEC becomes
min
{
fi (αi, q, y)
∣∣0 ∈ F (k)(α, q, y) +NGk(q(k), y(k)) (k = 1, . . . , K)}
(i = 1, . . . , N), (SEPEC)
where q =
(
q(1), . . . , q(K)
)
, y =
(
y(1), . . . , y(K)
)
and
fi (αi, q, y) =
K∑
k=1
pk
[
(γi − αi) q
(k)
i − δi
(
q
(k)
i
)2]
(i = 1, . . . , N),
F (k) (α, q, y) =
(
α + 2 [diag δ] q(k)
0
)
(k = 1, . . . , K).
Here, the pk are the probabilities for the demand scenarios d
(k), so in particular they fulfill
the relations
K∑
k=1
pk = 1, pk ≥ 0 (k = 1, . . . , K).
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In order to apply Theorem 2.1, we rewrite (SEPEC) as a usual EPEC. To this aim we
put
F :=
(
F (1), . . . , F (K)
)
, G := G1 × · · · ×GK .
Owing to the calculus rule
NG (q, y) = NG1(q
(1), y(1))× · · · ×NGK (q
(K), y(K)),
(SEPEC) boils down to (EPEC) as presented in Section 2. Since F is a linear mapping,
the multifunction (9) is polyhedral and we may directly apply the necessary optimality
conditions of Theorem 2.1 without checking the constraint qualification.
As in Section 4.1, we shall be interested in so-called interior solutions for the ease of
presentations. Owing to the scenario character of parts of the solution, we have to make
this concept more precise: A solution (α¯, q¯, y¯) of (7) with the data specified above is called
an interior solution, if it satisfies
α¯i > 0, 0 < q¯
(k)
i < qˆi, −yˆi < y¯
(k)
i < yˆi (i = 1, . . . , N ; k = 1, . . . , K) . (29)
Recalling, that partial derivative just with respect to αi rather than with respect to (αi, βi)
have to be considered now, we deal with
∇αifi (αi, q, y) = −
K∑
k=1
pkq
(k)
i
[∇αiF (α, q, y)]
T =
((
eTi , 0
)
|. . .|
(
eTi , 0
))
,
where ei denotes the i-th standard unit vector in RN . Then, writing the i-th multiplier
in the necessary optimality conditions as
v¯i =
(
v¯
(1)
i , . . . , v¯
(K)
i
)
,
the first equation (11) becomes
K∑
k=1
pkq¯
(k)
i =
K∑
k=1
v¯
(k)
ii . (30)
Next, repeating (scenario-wise) the same argumentation as the one leading to (24), and
taking into account that β = δ, one verifies the existence of λ(k) ∈ RN+ , such that(
α¯+ 2 [diag δ] q¯(k)
0
)
=
(
λ(k)
BTλ(k)
)
(k = 1, . . . , K).
This may be condensed to the relations
BT (α¯+ 2 [diag δ] q¯(k)) = 0 (k = 1, . . . , K). (31)
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When describing the polyhedron G introduced above as an inequality system of the type
Ax ≤ b as required in Section 3, one would have to put
A :=


A˜ 0
. . .
0 A˜

 , A˜ :=


−I −B
−I 0
I 0
0 −I
0 I

 ,
x :=
(
q(1), y(1), · · · , q(K), y(K)
)T
, b :=
(
−d(1), 0, qˆ,−yˆ, yˆ, · · · ,−d(K), 0, qˆ,−yˆ, yˆ
)T
On the other hand, looking for interior solutions according to (29), only the inequalities
of the type q(k) + By(k) ≥ d(k) are binding (compare discussion in the beginning of the
proof of Lemma 4.1). Hence,
q(k) +By(k) = d(k) (k = 1, . . . , K) (32)
and the matrix AI introduced in Corollary 3.7 has the shape
AI =


(−I |−B ) 0
. . .
0 (−I |−B )

 .
Then, with the partition v¯
(k)
i = ([v¯
(k)
i ]a, [v¯
(k)
i ]b), the first statement of Corollary 3.7 allows
to extract the following two conditions from the inclusion (12):
[v¯
(k)
i ]a +B[v¯
(k)
i ]b = 0 (i = 1, . . . , N ; k = 1, . . . , K). (33)
Moreover,
∇yfi = 0
∇qfi = (∇q(1)fi, . . . ,∇q(K)fi) (i = 1, . . . , N), where
∇q(k)fi(αi, q, y) = (0, . . . , 0, pk[γi − αi − 2δiq
(k)
i ], 0, . . . , 0)
and
∇yF = 0
∇qF (α, q, y)
T v¯i =

 2[diag δ][v¯
(1)
i ]a
. . .
2[diag δ][v¯
(K)
i ]a

 (i = 1, . . . , N).
Thus, the second statement of Corollary 3.7 together with the inclusion (12) yields the
existence of multipliers µ(k) ∈ Rn such that(
w
(k)
i
0
)
=
(
µ(k)
BTµ(k)
)
(k = 1, . . . , K; i = 1, . . . , N), where
w
(k)
i := (2δ1v¯
(k)
i1 , . . . , 2δi−1v¯
(k)
i,i−1, 2δiv¯
(k)
ii + pk[γi − α¯i − 2δiq¯
(k)
i ],
2δi+1v¯
(k)
i,i+1, . . . , 2δN v¯
(k)
iN )
T .
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In brief,
BTw
(k)
i = 0 (k = 1, . . . , K; i = 1, . . . , N) (34)
Summarizing, M-stationary solutions of (SEPEC) are characterized by the relations (30),
(31), (32), (33) and (34).
4.4 Explicit calculation of M-stationary solutions for a small
example
Finally, we want to illustrate the results of the previous section by explicitly calculating
the solution of (SEPEC) for the smallest meaningful example, namely a network consisting
of N = 2 nodes which are linked by one single arc (m = 1). In this case, the incidence
matrix simply becomes
B =
(
1
−1
)
.
First, (30) may be shortly written as
Eq¯i =
K∑
k=1
v¯
(k)
ii (i = 1, 2), (35)
where ’E’ refers to the expected value. With the concrete shape of B, (31) takes the form
α¯1 + 2δ1q¯
(k)
1 = α¯2 + 2δ2q¯
(k)
2 (k = 1, . . . , K). (36)
Summing up all these equations upon multiplying them by the probabilities pk, one arrives
at
α¯1 + 2δ1Eq¯1 = α¯2 + 2δ2Eq¯2. (37)
Next, we derive from (34) the equations
2δ1v¯
(k)
11 + pk[γ1 − α¯1 − 2δ1q¯
(k)
1 ] = 2δ2v¯
(k)
12
2δ2v¯
(k)
22 + pk[γ2 − α¯2 − 2δ2q¯
(k)
2 ] = 2δ1v¯
(k)
21
}
(k = 1, . . . , K). (38)
Summing up over k the upper equations, we get
2δ1
K∑
k=1
v¯
(k)
11 + γ1 − α¯1 − 2δ1Eq¯1 = 2δ2
K∑
k=1
v¯
(k)
12 .
Taking into account (35), this reduces to
γ1 − α¯1 = 2δ2
K∑
k=1
v¯
(k)
12 . (39)
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Furthermore, (33) yields
v¯
(k)
11 = −v¯
(k)
12 , v¯
(k)
21 = −v¯
(k)
22 (k = 1, . . . , K). (40)
Combining the first of these relations with (39) and (35), we obtain
γ1 − α¯1 + 2δ2Eq¯1 = 0. (41)
Similarly, the corresponding second relations in (38) and (40) allow to derive that
γ2 − α¯2 + 2δ1Eq¯2 = 0. (42)
Finally, reading the components of (32) with the concrete shape of B gives
q¯
(k)
1 + y¯
(k) = d
(k)
1 ; q¯
(k)
2 − y¯
(k) = d
(k)
2 (k = 1, . . . , K) (43)
Adding both equations leads to
q¯
(k)
1 + q¯
(k)
2 = d
(k)
1 + d
(k)
2 (k = 1, . . . , K). (44)
Summation over k entails that Eq¯1+Eq¯2 = Ed1+Ed2. Now, this last equation along with
(37), (41) and (42) constitutes a system of four linear equations in the four unknowns α¯1,
α¯2, Eq¯1 and Eq¯2, which is easily resolved for its solution
α¯1 = γ1 + δ2
(
Ed1 + Ed2 +
γ2 − γ1
2 (δ1 + δ2)
)
α¯2 = γ2 + δ1
(
Ed1 + Ed2 +
γ1 − γ2
2 (δ1 + δ2)
)
Eq¯1 =
1
2
(Ed1 + Ed2) +
γ2 − γ1
4 (δ1 + δ2)
Eq¯2 =
1
2
(Ed1 + Ed2) +
γ1 − γ2
4 (δ1 + δ2)
.
With these α¯1 and α¯2 one may combine (44) and (36) in order to identify the scenario-
dependent amounts of electricity generation of both competitors:
q¯
(k)
1 =
1
2
(γ2 − γ1) + (δ1 − δ2) (Ed1 + Ed2) + 2δ2
(
d
(k)
1 + d
(k)
2
)
2 (δ1 + δ2)
(k = 1, . . . , K)
q¯
(k)
2 =
1
2
(γ1 − γ2) + (δ2 − δ1) (Ed1 + Ed2) + 2δ1
(
d
(k)
1 + d
(k)
2
)
2 (δ1 + δ2)
(k = 1, . . . , K) .
Next, using either of the two equations in (43), we may resolve for the scenario-dependent
amount of electricity sent from node 2 to node 1:
y¯(k) =
1
2
(γ1 − γ2) + (δ2 − δ1) (Ed1 + Ed2) + 2δ1d
(k)
1 − 2δ2d
(k)
2 (k = 1, . . . , K) .
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The expected value of this flow calculates as
Ey¯ =
1
2
(γ1 − γ2) + (δ1 + δ2) (Ed1 − Ed2) .
Finally, we determine the expected profits Epii of both competing generators:
Epi1 =
K∑
k=1
pk
[
(α¯1 − γ1) q¯
(k)
1 + δ1
(
q¯
(k)
1
)2]
= (α¯1 − γ1)Eq¯1 + δ1E (q¯1)
2
Epi2 = (α¯2 − γ2)Eq¯2 + δ2E (q¯2)
2
.
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